Abstract XML (eXtensible Markup Language) has recently emerged as the most relevant standardization e ort in the area of markup languages, and it is increasingly used as the language for information exchange over Web.
Introduction
Since the Web is becoming the main information dissemination means for most organizations, an increasing number of applications at internet and intranet level need access control mechanisms enforcing a selective access to information retrieved/exchanged over the Web. XML 12] has recently emerged as the most relevant standardization e ort in the area of markup languages, and it is increasingly used as the language for information exchange over Web. In this context, developing an access control mechanism in terms of XML is an important step for Web information security. In this paper, we present Author-X , a Java-based system for discretionary access control to XML documents. Author-X takes into account XML document characteristics, the presence of document types (called DTDs -Document Type De nitions-) describing the structure of documents at a schema level, and the types of actions that can be executed on XML documents (i.e., navigation and browsing), for implementing an access control mechanism tailored to XML. In particular, Author-X has the following distinguishing features: both set-oriented and document-oriented protection, by supporting DTD-level as well as document-level authorizations di erentiated protection of XML document and DTD contents by supporting positive and negative authorizations and multi-granularity protection objects, identi ed on the basis of the graph structure of XML documents and DTDs controlled propagation of authorizations among protection objects at di erent granularity levels, by enforcing multiple propagation options stating how an authorization de ned on a d o c u m e n t/DTD should apply by default to protection objects at a ner granularity l e v el within the document/DTD.
Author-X exploits authorizations stored in an XML Authorization Base and their propagation options to evaluate an access request issued by a user and determines if it can be completely satis ed, partially satis ed, or not satis ed at all. In case of a partially satis ed request, only a view of the requested document(s) is returned. Author-X is implemented in Java on top of the eXcelon database, which is used to store both the sources to be protected and the XML authorization base of the system. Architectural and implementation issues of Author-X are described, with particular attention to the authorization base and the access control mechanism. An application of Author-X to the protection of a real XML source, derived from the Sigmod Record source available over the Web 9] , is presented.
As far as we know, Author-X is the rst tool, we are aware of, supporting XML document protection. In fact, research work in this eld has concentrated more on the development of access control models for Web documents. For example, an access control model for HTML documents has been proposed in 8] , where authorizations can be given either to the whole document o r t o selected portions within the document. XML documents have a richer structure than HTML documents and there is the possibility of attaching a DTD to an XML document, describing its structure. Such aspects require the de nition and enforcement of more sophisticated access control mechanisms for XML, than the ones devised for HTML documents. An access control model for XML documents has beenrecently proposed in 5]. Such model borrows some ideas from previous models for object-oriented databases and does not actually take i n to account some peculiarities of XML. For example, the case of documents not conforming/partially conforming to a DTD is not considered, and no support is provided to the security administrator for protecting such documents. Moreover, this model only provides the read access mode. Author-X supports di erent policies for dealing with partially and not conforming documents, and supports a n umberof specialized access modes for browsing and authoring. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes characteristics of the Author-X discretionary access control model for XML and describes the overall system architecture of Author-X . Section 3 describes the structure of an XML source and of the authorization base. Section 4 describes the access control implementation in Author-X , with examples of its application. Section 5 illustrates expected interactions of the Security Administrator with Author-X for authorization management. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines future research directions.
2 Overview of Author-X According to XML 10], building blocks of XML are nested, tagged elements. Each tagged element has zero or more subelements, and zero or more attributes. Elements can nested at any depth in the document structure. Elements can be linked by means of IDREF or IDREFS attributes. Based on this nested structure, an XML document can berepresented as a graph, as shown in Figure 1 . Author-X has been conceived for enforcing XML document protection, with the following requirements: <elem tag attribute name="..."> <elem tag attribute name="..." attr name="..."> </elem tag> <elem tag attr name="AA"> </elem tag> <elem tag attr name="AA"> </elem tag> </elem tag> (a) Di erentiated p r otection of documents stored in an XML source to re ect the di erent protection needs holding on them. An XML document can contain information with di erent protection requirement in di erent points of its structure. Author-X enforces di erent protection requirements in di erent components of the same document, by implementing a ne-level authorization granularity.
Propagation of authorizations de ned on documents and/or portions of them. According to the propagation principle, an authorization speci ed on a certain protection object o \applies by default" to a set of protection objects that have a relationship with o. In Author-X , the relationships considered for propagation are the element-to-subelements, element-to-attributes, element-to-links relations, deriving from the graph structure of documents and DTDs, and the DTD-to-instances relation, holding between a DTD and a set of XML documents that conform to it (valid documents).
In the following, we rst summarize the discretionary access control model of Author-X , de ned to enforce requirements above. A more detailed description of the model can be found in 2, 3] . Then, we illustrate the architecture of Author-X .
Author-X access control model
Authorizations in the Author-X model have the following format:
< users protection-objs priv prop-opt sign > where users denotes a set of users to which the authorization applies, and sign 2 f +, -g is the sign of the authorization, stating if it is a permission (sign = +) or a prohibition (sign =-).
(*) the most speci c propagated authorization is taken Moreover, the component protection-objs denotes the document(s) (or parts of document(s)) to which the authorization applies. Protection objects in an authorization are speci ed by rst identifying the target document/DTD and then by specifying the path of protection object(s) within the target. Syntax for protection object speci cation in Author-X is described in Section 2. The priv component of an authorization denotes the access modes that can beexercised on the protection objects speci ed in the authorization. We support two di erent kinds of privileges: browsing and authoring privileges. Browsing privileges allow users to read the information in an element (read privilege) or to navigate through its links (navigate). Authoring privileges allow users to modify (or delete) the content of an element ( write privilege) or to append new information in an element ( append privilege). Finally, the prop-opt component allows one to specify how authorizations specied at a given level propagate to lower level elements. The following options are provided: i)
cascade: the authorization propagates to all the direct and indirect subelements of the element(s) speci ed in the authorization 2) first lev: the authorization propagates to all the direct subelements of the element(s) speci ed in the authorization 3) no prop: no propagation is performed.
Con ict management. The possibility of specifying both positive and negative authorizations introduces potential con icts among authorizations, in that a user may have two authorizations for the same privilege on the same protection object but with di erent signs. These con icting authorizations can be either explicit or derived through propagation. We do not consider the simultaneous presence of con icting authorizations as an inconsistency rather we de ne a con ict resolution policy which is based on the notion of most speci c authorization.
The con ict resolution policy of Author-X is based on the following principles:
authorizations speci ed at the document level prevail over authorizations speci ed at the DTD level authorizations speci ed at a given level in the DTD/document hierarchy prevail over authorization speci ed at higher levels when con icts are not solved by the above rules, we consider as prevailing negative authorizations. Figure 2 summarizes the con ict resolution policy. In gure, prop means that the sign is propagated to a protection object from another one at a higher level of the structural hierarchy.
Architecture of Author-X
Author-X is build on top of eXcelon 6]. eXcelon is an XML data server for building web applications. EXcelon manages an XMLstore where the XML data can beindexed and manipulated using the Document Object Model (DOM) 6], and queried using the XQL language 6]. Programmers can extend eXcelon functionalities by writing server extensions in Java. The purpose of server extensions is to extend the eXcelon server with custom modules to cover speci c application requirements. Figure 3 shows the general architecture of an eXcelon document s e r v er enhanced with Author-X .
Security components of the architecture are:
XMLStore, which is organized in two components: XML source, which stores XML documents and DTDs to beprotected, and X-authorization base, which stores authorizations de ned for access control.
Author-X -core, which is the main component of the architecture. It is composed of two Java server extensions, X-access and X-admin. The X-access is the server extension implementing access control over the XML source based on authorizations contained in X-authorization base. The X-admin is the server extension providing support functionalities to the Security Administrator for authorization management.
Author-X -core is part of the eXcelon data server and interacts with the external environment by means of an eXcelon client API. Users and the Security Administrator interact with Author-X -core by means of speci c user applications, or through the Web, using an eXcelon explorer or a Web server extension. Users submit access requests which are processed by the X-access component of Author-X -core, and receive back the (portion of) requested data in the XML source he/she is authorized to access. The Security Administrator interacts with the Xadmin component o f A u t h o r -X-core, for performing adiministrative operations on authorization in the X-authorization base.
3 Structure of the Author-X XMLStore
In this section, we describe in more detail the structure of the XMLStore, whereas in the following sections we illustrate the X-access and X-admin components of Author-X -core.
XML source
The XML source component of XMLStore contains XML documents to be protected with their DTDs, if de ned. In particular, the source can contain well-formed or valid documents. A wellformed document is a document that follows the grammar rules of XML 12] . Valid documents have an associated DTD de ning their structure. Valid documents are considered instances of a corresponding DTD by Author-X . To illustrate functionalities of Author-X , w e h a ve de ned an XML source containing the Sigmod Record document and its associated DTD. Examples given in the remaining of the paper will refer to the portion of XML source illustrated in Figure 4 and Figure 5 . Figure 5 : (a) An example of DTD speci cation for the document of Figure 4 and (b) its corresponding graph representation
X -authorization base
The X-authorization base is an XML le (auth.xml) storing authorizations on the XML source contents. Authorizations in the X-authorization base conform to the DTD of Figure 6 .
According to the DTD of Figure 6 , authorizations are organized into an \authorizations" XML document with a subelement users, denoting users, and a subelement auths, denoting access authorizations. The users subelement contains a user subelement for each user to be authorized to access the documents in the protected store. Each user subelement i s i d e n ti ed by the login of the corresponding user (attribute id) and contains the password of the user (attribute passwd). The auths subelement contains an authspec subelement for each authorization given to a certain user on the documents in the given document store. Each authspec subelement i s c haracterized by the following attributes:
userid: it contains a reference to the user-id of the user to which the authorization refers target: it stores the le name of the XML document/DTD to which the authorization refers path: it stores a path within the XML le speci ed in target corresponding to the speci c protection object(s) to which the authorization applies. path is based on the following prop: it stores the kind of propagation of the authorization and it is a value in the set fno prop, one level, cascadeg.
Example 1 Suppose Mary and Rose must be authorized to read all the issues contained in the Sigmod Record, but they must not be authorized to read articles' abstract. Such access control policy can be enforced by specifying two authorizations, at DTD-level, for both Mary and Rose. The rst one is a positive authorization for the READ privilege with the CASCADE option on the 2 Attribute names are preceded by the symb o l @ , a s i n X p a t h a n d X QL. <authorizations> <users> <user id="Mary" passwd="%$#$%"= > <user id="Rose" passwd="&#$%"= > </users> <auths> <auth-spec userid="Mary" target="SigmodRecord.dtd" path="/issue" priv="READ" type="GRANT" prop="CASCADE"= > <auth-spec userid="Rose" target="SigmodRecord.dtd" path="/issue" priv="READ" type="GRANT" prop="CASCADE"= > <auth-spec userid="Mary" target="SigmodRecord.dtd" path="/issue/articles/article/abstract" priv="READ" type="DENY" prop="NO PROP"= > <auth-spec userid="Rose" target="SigmodRecord.dtd" path="/issue/articles/article/abstract" priv="READ" type="DENY" prop="NO PROP"= > <auth-spec userid="Mary" target="SigmodRecord.xml" path="/issue/articles/article @id="WB99"]" priv="READ" type="GRANT" prop="CASCADE"= > </auths> </authorizations> Figure 7 : An example of X-authorization base issue elements. The second is a negative authorization for the READ privilege on the abstract element. Suppose now we want to allow Mary to read all the information in article WB99. We can give Mary a positive authorization for the READ privilege with the CASCADE option on WB99.
The resulting X-authorization base is shown in Figure 7 .
To speed up access control, the X-authorization base le is maintained ordered, according to the priority relation among authorizations imposed by our con ict resolution policy. Less speci c authorizations are stored at the top of the le, whereas more speci c authorizations are stored towards the bottom. When two authorizations with the same subject, protection object(s) and privilege but di erent sign are entered, the positive authorization is stored before the negative one. Sorting is executed each time a new authorization is entered into the X-authorization base.
Thus, by scanning the le sequentially, authorizations are analyzed according to increasing order of importance. As we will see in Section 4, this sorting makes the access control mechanism more e cient. 4 The X -access component of Author-X Di erent users can have di erent views of the same XML document, depending on the document portions they are authorized to access. Only the portion(s) of an XML document for which a user holds a proper authorization has (have) to be returned to the user in response to an access request on the document. In the following, we describe how access control is enforced by Author-X .
Access control strategies
Users can request access to documents under two di erent modalities: browsing and authoring. A user requests a browsing access when he/she wants to access the document (and navigating its links), without modifying it, whereas, requests an authoring access when he/she wants to modify the document. Access can also be requested wrt a speci c portion(s) of a document.
Thus, an access request r is represented as a tuple r= huser, target, path,acc modalityi, where user is the user requesting the access, target is the XML document t o w h i c h the access is requested, path is a path within the requested document (speci ed trough an XQL query 7]) which eventually selects speci c portions of the requested document, and acc modality 2 fbrowsing,authoringg speci es whether the user is requesting a browsing or an authoring access. When the access request r is issued, the access control mechanism checks which authorizations (both positive and negative) user has on the requested document. Such authorizations can beeither explicitly or implicitly given by the propagation policiesenforced by our model (i.e., DTD-to-instances, element-to-subelements, element-to-attributes/links). Based on such authorizations, user can receive a view of the requested document that contains only those portions for which he/she has a corresponding positive authorization which is not overwritten by a negative con icting authorization. In the case of totally authorized requests, the view coincides with the whole document (or with all the requested portions in the case the user does not require the access to the whole document). When, no positive authorizations are found for the requested document, or all of them are overwritten by negative authorizations, the access is denied. To enforce access control, two alternative strategies can be adopted:
1. The query contained in the access control request is analyzed to verify whether the user has the right (partial or total) to execute it against the target document. Based on this analysis, a view of the document (possibly empty) is returned to the user.
2. All the elements and/or attributes for which the requesting user does not have an appropriate authorization are removed from the target document, before executing the query contained in the access request. The query is then applied to such pruned version and the result is returned to the user.
Author-X adopts the second strategy. The main reason is that enforcing the rst strategy makes the access control mechanism dependent from the query language (since it requires an analysis of the query to verify whether the user is authorized to execute it or not). XQL, the query language provided by Excelon is not yet a standard, at the time of this writing. This means that any modi cation in the XQL syntax would require a modi cation of the access control module. Thus, we prefer to adopt the second strategy that, although less e cient than the rst, allows us to develop an access control module independent from the query language adopted by the XML source. 
Implementation
The algorithm for enforcing access control is reported in Figure 8 . For lack of space, we report here only the algorithm for browsing access requests. A similar algorithm has beendeveloped for authoring requests 4]. The algorithm takes as input an access request and returns a view of the requested document (V user (target)) containing only those portions of the document for which the user requesting the access has an appropriate authorization. If the view is empty, the access in denied. The strategy to enforce access control is based on the following steps. First (steps 1 and 2) a query is executed on the X-authorization base to extract all the browsing authorizations speci ed for the target document (including those that are eventually speci ed on the relative DTD). Such authorizations are put into le Auth (step 3). This le is ordered according to the priority relation among authorizations implied by our con ict resolution policy. 3 If Auth is empty the access is denied (step 4). Otherwise, to speed up authorization checking, a new XML document (i.e.,structTarget) having the same structure of the target le is built (step 5). Such le is obtained by replacing each attribute value in the target le with a null value. Attribute values are then used to record the type of authorization (that is, negative vs. positive) that applies to such attributes. structTarget also contains an additional attribute (that from now on we call authorization attribute) for each element in the target le, which is used to keep track of the type of authorization which applies to the corresponding element in the target le. Then, the algorithm sequentially scans Auth and for each authorization in the le, it identi es the elements/attributes or links to which it applies, based on the protection object in the authorization and on its propagation option. If the authorization is positive, then the value of each attribute/link to which it applies is put equal to GRANT, otherwise the value is set equal to DENY (eventually overwriting its current value). If the authorization applies to a whole element then the corresponding authorization attribute is set equal to GRANT or DENY, depending on the authorization sign. The sign speci ed on an element is then assigned recursively to all (or only the direct) subelements and relative attributes, according to the propagation option. The above operations are performed by function Apply, reported in Figure 9 . The view the user has on the target document, is then built (step 8) by pruning from the target all the attributes having a null or DENY value in structTarget, and all the elements having an analogous value for the authorization attributes. This view is built by function Prune. If the request is for the whole document, the pruned le is returned to the user submitting the request, if it is not empty. Otherwise, the access is denied. By contrast, if the request is for selected portion(s) of the target document, the path contained in the access request is evaluated against the pruned le (step 9). If this evaluation results in a non empty l e , s u c h le is returned Figure 10 shows the access control process. In the gure, we use symbol \;" instead of DENY, and \+" instead of GRANT. Author-X extracts the browsing authorizations for user Rose and evaluates them against the le SigmodRecord.xml. The result of the evaluation is a graph, where each node is labeled with symbol \;", if a negative authorization applies to the corresponding attribute/element, it is labeled with symbol \+", if a positive authorization applies to the corresponding attribute/element. The view to be returned to Rose is obtained by dropping from the graph the elements with a label di erent from \+", and by extracting from the resulting graph the elements/attributes identi ed by the path: /issue/articles/article id="WB99"] contained in the access request. As a result, Rose is returned a view of article WB99 (shown on the right hand side of Figure 10 ) that does not contain the abstract element, since she has a negative authorization on such element. Figure 11 shows the graphical interface provided by Author-X for access request submission (the access request is the one of Example 2). The left hand side of the gure shows how the user can submit his/her request, whereas the right hand side shows the access request result. DTD-based policy: authorizations are speci ed at the DTD level, and propagate due to the element-to-subelement and the element-to-attribute/link relationship within the DTD as well as to all XML documents that are valid instances of the DTD in the source, according to the DTD-to-instance relationship.
Document-based policy: authorizations are speci ed at the document l e v el, and apply only to the considered document. Authorization propagation occurs only due to the element-tosubelement and the element-to-attribute/link relationship within the considered document.
Based on these policies, authorization management for valid and well-formed documents can be enforced by the Security Administrator in Author-X as follows:
Valid document protection: the DTD-based policy is adopted, in that valid documents are instances of some DTD in the source. As a consequence, the Security Administrator speci es authorizations at the DTD level which apply by default to all its valid document instances. Exceptions to the policy de ned at the DTD level are modeled by speci c authorizations de ned on the involved document instances, according to the documentbased policy. Well-formed documents: di erent approaches are supported. According to a classi cationbased approach, the Security Administrator decides to adopt the DTD-based policy also the well-formed documents. To this end, well-formed documents to beprotected are rst classi ed against available DTDs in the source, with the goal of nding the \best matching" DTD. If such a DTD is found by the tool, protection of a well-formed document is enforced by propagating authorizations de ned for the selected DTD to the document. This propagation can betotal or partial, depending on the level of conformance between the well-formed document and the selected DTD (conformance vs. partial conformance). In case of partial conformance, the Security Administrator can manually de ne additional authorization on non-matching portions of the well-formed document, if required, following the document-based policy. According to an instance-based approach, the Security Administrator de nes the authorization policy for the considered well-formed document. This requires the de nition from scratch of all needed authorizations, following the documentbased policy. The document-based policy is also adopted when no conforming DTD is found after the classi cation process, and also to specify exceptions or additional authorizations to the policy de ned in the selected DTD, when the classi cation-based approach is taken. The classi cation-based approach exploits the propagation principle to limit the manual activity of the Security Administrator in the de nition of the authorization policy for a well-formed document. The classi cation-based approach relies on suitable mechanisms to automatically derive all required authorizations for all the involved users such as, for example, rule-based mechanisms 1]. The Security Administrator can interactively validate derived authorizations to check their suitability to the well-formed document to be protected.
For instance, if all information in a set of valid documents has the same protection requirements, then the Security Administrator can de ne authorizations at the DTD level, with the cascade option. By contrast, when di erent subelement(s) (respectively, attributes/links) of a DTD need di erent authorization policies, it is convenient to guarantee a minimal common protection on the whole DTD by de ning an authorization with the no prop or first lev propagation option. A numberof additional authorizations are then de ned on the subelement(s) (respectively, attribute(s)/link(s)) of the DTD with the most appropriate privileges and sign to enforce the policy holding on the speci c subelement(s) (respectively, attribute(s)/link(s)). In a similar way, the Security Administrator proceeds in de ning authorizations on well-formed documents, following the document-based policy.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have presented Author-X , a Java-based system for access control to XML sources. In particular, Author-X supports positive and negative authorizations for browsing and authoring privileges with controlled propagation. Core functionalities of access control and authorization base management h a ve been implemented as Java server extensions on top of the eXcelon data server. Currently, we are setting up a comprehensive administration environment, by developing interactive tool support for the Security Administrator to guide the choice of the bestpolicyto be adopted for document protection, based on the results of document classi cation process.
